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Investment E¤ects of Wealth Taxes under
Uncertainty and Irreversibility
Abstract
The growing dissatisfaction with perceived distributional inequality and budgetary con-
straints gave rise to a discussion on the (re-)introduction of wealth taxes. Wealth taxes are
typically levied on private wealth, in some countries also on corporate wealth. To avoid
misleading statements concerning possible distributional consequences of wealth taxes,
preceding analyses of the economic and particularly investment e¤ects are necessary. As
investments drive job creation, tax-induced changes in investment timing may signi-
cantly a¤ect the income and wealth distribution. We analyze the impact of wealth taxes
on investment timing under uncertainty and irreversibility and the propensity to carry
out risky projects. Using a Dixit/Pindyck type real options model we nd that wealth
taxes have real e¤ects. This means that higher wealth tax rates can either stimulate or
depress the propensity to invest in risky projects. We nd that apparently paradoxical
wealth tax e¤ects (accelerated investment due to higher wealth tax rates) are more likely
for low interest rates and for high-risk investments. Using either historical cost or fair
value accounting may a¤ect investment timing ambiguously. Thus, the design of wealth
taxes is crucial for the resulting delay or acceleration of investment. Although our model
takes an individual perspective, our ndings are also relevant for the current tax policy
discussion on the introduction of wealth taxes. Our results indicate that wealth taxes are
particularly harmful for specic classes of investments, for example low-risk investments.
JEL classication: H25; H21
Keywords: wealth tax, investment decisions, real options, timing exibility, uncertainty,
irreversibility
Acknowledgements: We thank Martin Jacob, Richard Sansing, Regina Ortmann and
the participants of the TAF Research Seminar in December 2014 in Paderborn, the par-
ticipants of the SOWI Research Seminar in January 2015 in Graz, the participants of the
Spring meeting of the Tax Section of the German Academic Association for Business Re-
search in March 2015 in Passau, and the 1st Berlin-Vallendar Conference on Tax Research
in July 2015 in Berlin. The usual disclaimer applies.
Investment E¤ects of Wealth Taxes under
Uncertainty and Irreversibility
1 Introduction
The tight scal constraints in several European countries as well as the growing dissat-
isfaction with perceived distributional inequality (for example, OECD 2015) gave rise to
a discussion on the (re-)introduction of wealth taxes.1 To avoid misleading statements
concerning possible distributional consequences of wealth taxes, preceding analyses of the
economic and particularly investment e¤ects are necessary. As investments drive job cre-
ation, tax-induced changes in investment may signicantly a¤ect the income and wealth
distribution. If wealth taxation a¤ects investment decisions in an unexpected way, fore-
casts of distributional e¤ects of wealth taxes are necessarily awed. We investigate the
investment timing e¤ects of individual or corporate wealth taxes under uncertainty and
irreversibility because investment timing is an important indicator for investorspropen-
sity to carry out risky projects. The goal of our paper is to gure out whether wealth
taxes have real e¤ects and under what conditions wealth taxes foster or hinder risky
investments.
Focussing on tax rate e¤ects in the rst place, we nd that an increase in the wealth
tax rate can either delay (hinder) or accelerate (foster) risky investments. In terms of
risk taking this result implies that higher wealth tax rates can either stimulate or depress
the propensity to invest in risky projects. A similar ambiguous result can be derived
for increased wealth taxation of the default alternative (risk-free nancial investment).
Furthermore, for su¢ ciently low tax values of a project due to a low initial tax value
or high depreciation rates for wealth tax purposes, higher wealth tax rates surprisingly
1The e¤ects of wealth taxes have been controversally discussed in previous years. See, e.g., Balogh
(1964), Stiglitz (1969), Mieszkowski (1972), Thurow (1972), Bentick (1979), Mills (1981), Brennan and
Nellor (1982), Michalos (1988), Bird (1991), Burbridge (1991), Davies (1991), Mintz (1991), and Kocher-
lakota (2005).
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can accelerate investment. Higher wealth taxation of nancial investments in comparison
to real investments can delay real investment if the wealth tax rate is su¢ ciently high.
We nd that such apparently paradoxical wealth tax e¤ects  accelerated investment
upon a wealth tax rate increase are more likely for low interest rates and for high-risk
investments. As a change in investments following an increase in wealth taxes will a¤ect
prots and job creation and may increase distributional inequality our results indicate
that tax politicians who strive to reduce inequality need detailed information about the
e¤ects of wealth taxation on di¤erent types of investment projects. Tax legislators should
be aware that the e¤ects depend on the expected development of pre-tax prots as well
as the valuation of assets for income and wealth tax purposes.
In contrast to tax rate e¤ects we nd that valuation e¤ects are unambiguous: higher initial
or subsequent valuation of assets for wealth tax purposes always delays investment. A tax
legislator whose intention is to encourage risk taking should dene a relatively small tax
base. Moreover, it is ambiguous whether historical cost valuation or fair value accounting
accelerate investment.
Our ndings are relevant for individual investors as well as for the current tax policy
discussion on whether or not to (re-)introduce a general wealth tax. For example, the IMF
suggested the introduction of wealth taxes in developed countries in various recent studies
(IMF 2013, IMF 2014). Furthermore, Atkinson (1971), Piketty, and Saez (2003), Saez
and Veall (2005), Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011) and more recently Piketty (2014)
received a lot of attention with descriptives of the development of the capital/income
ratio over time in many countries. As a consequence, he raises the claim for wealth taxes.
Although this work has been heavily criticized, the call for an introduction of e¤ective
redistributive instruments fed the public concerns on inequality signicantly and led to
an intensied political debate on reintroducing wealth taxes and increasing inheritance
taxation.2
2See, for example, Cnossen and Bovenberg (2001) for the Netherlands, Edson (2012) for Norway,
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Most countries levy taxes on specic property, such as real estate, vehicles and other
assets. However, many countries have since the 1990s abolished a general wealth taxation
(see, for example, OECD 2014).3 The following table summarizes information on wealth
tax rates and wealth tax abolishment, respectively:
Country Abolition Tax rate at individual level Tax rate at corporate level
Algeria max. 1.5%
Austria 1994
Denmark 1995
Finland 2006
France max. 1.5%
Germany 1997
Iceland max. 2 %
India 2015
Ireland 1997
Luxembourg 0.5%
Netherlands 2001
Norway max. 1.1%
Spain 2007, reintroduction 2012 max. 2.5%
Sweden 2007
Switzerland/Zurich max. 0.657% 0.16425%
Table 1: Wealth taxation and its abolition in selected countries
Sources: KPMG (2012a, 2012b), BMF (2013), EY (2014a, 2014b), IBFD (2015)
Notes: Wealth taxes on selected property, like taxes on vehicles, real estate, etc. are not included
in this table
The proponents of wealth taxes often link their arguments to the budgetary consequences
of the recent nancial and scal crisis and argue that particularly wealthy people should
contribute their fair share to society. Opponents of wealth taxation suspect that wealth
taxation could depress investment, hinder or prevent risk-taking and innovations and lead
to capital ight. This could induce even lower total tax revenues than in an environment
without wealth taxation.
Glennerster (2012) for U.K., Ristea and Trandar (2010) for Romania, Keuschnigg et al. (2013) for
Austria, Sureth and Maiterth (2008), Schratzenstaller (2011), Maiterth and Houben (2012), Spengel,
Evers, and Evers (2013), Bach, Beznoska, and Steiner (2014), Hoppe, Maiterth, and Sureth (2015) for
Germany. Furthermore, Auerbach and Hassett (2015), who reviewed Pikettys work do not see a wealth
tax as an appropriate policy instrument.
3High administrative costs, low tax revenues and unsolved problems in asset valuation were the most
important causes for abolishing the wealth tax.
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Against the background of this controversial discussion, it is particularly important to
disentangle the e¤ects of a wealth tax on investment under uncertainty. In this respect
the economic e¤ects crucially depend on the impact of wealth taxes on investment timing,
and not only on the decision on whether or not to invest. If risky projects are considered
innovative they can signicantly contribute to economic growth. Thus, postponement of
these projects may be especially harmful for economic development and subsequently for
the distribution of income and wealth.
Whereas the e¤ects of prot (or income) taxation under uncertainty are well known since
the late 1990s (for example, Niemann 1999a, 1999b, Sureth 1999, Pennings 2000, Agliardi
2001, Panteghini 2001, 2004, 2005, Sureth 2002, Niemann and Sureth 2004, 2005, Alvarez
and Koskela 2008, Schneider and Sureth 2010, Gries, Prior, and Sureth 2012, Niemann
and Sureth 2013), the e¤ects of wealth taxes have not yet been investigated under condi-
tions of uncertainty and irreversibility. This is surprising against the background of the
recent ndings on the economic implications of prot taxation on investments in risky
projects. Prior literature identied parameter-dependent, partially subsidizing as well as
discriminating e¤ects of prot taxation on risky investments that are due to uncertainty
(for example, Alvarez and Koskela 2008, Schneider and Sureth 2010, Gries et al. 2012,
Niemann and Sureth 2013). These ndings indicate that tax reforms that are intended
to foster investment such as tax rate cuts, may have dysfunctional e¤ects on investment
activities, in particular in high-risk industries. Although wealth taxes are often considered
to further hinder risky investment, hardly any corresponding research on wealth taxation
under uncertainty has been conducted. If the wealth tax is precisely levied on the market
value as dened by the present value of future cash ows from the underlying capital, the
investment e¤ects generated by the wealth tax will in present value terms not di¤er from
those of a prot tax. However, for many types of capital assets market values cannot be
observed due to a lack of su¢ ciently liquid markets. Furthermore, the tax legislator for
example might intentionally dene asset values that are only weakly related to the market
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value to simplify the tax assessment. Consequently, the e¤ects of wealth taxes on risky
investments are likely to be di¤erent from those of prot taxes. Therefore, a detailed
analysis of wealth taxes and their e¤ects on risky investment decisions is important.
Several studies, such as Vlassenko (2001), Arnott (2005), Arnott and Petrova (2006),
investigate various property tax systems conceptually and theoretically with respect to
e¢ ciency and fairness. Property taxes are similar to wealth taxes as they can be regarded
as taxes on specic assets. These studies identify distortions in e¢ ciency of di¤erent
magnitude depending on the property tax design. Dye, McGuire, and Merriman (2001)
study empirically the impact of property taxes on business activities and nd that high
property tax rates lead to signicantly slower growth rates. Craft and Schmidt (2005)
nd evidence for signicant decreases in vehicular capital after changes in vehicle property
taxes. In line with that result Allee, Lynch, Petroni, and Schroeder (2015) nd signicant
sensitivities of petroleum reneries in their crude oil inventories when they experience a
personal property tax. Hansson (2008) analyzes the abolishment or suspension of general
wealth taxation in Austria in 1994, in Denmark in 1997, in Germany in 1997, and in the
Netherlands in 2001 empirically using a simple model of the choice between becoming an
entrepreneur or an employee. She nds a perceptible but only small impact of wealth tax
abolishment on entrepreneurial activity. Obviously, the existing empirical studies do not
permit to draw clear-cut conclusions.
In deterministic models the impact of wealth taxes on investment behavior was extensively
analyzed in the German analytical tax literature in the 1980s and 1990s, for example, by
Wagner/Dirrigl (1980), Siegel (1982), Mellwig (1985), or Georgi (1994). They nd that
wealth taxation has an ambiguous impact on investment decisions, depending on the
valuation of assets for wealth tax purposes.
To the best of our knowledge only van Wijnbergen and Estache (1999) investigate the
impact of a special case of wealth taxes under uncertainty explicitly. They examine the
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impact of a minimum asset tax, which is similar to a wealth tax, on high risk rms using an
option pricing approach and a Monte Carlo simulation with Brazilian data. They consider
uncertain returns and nd increased sectorial distortions and that high risk rms do not
seem to be hit harder by the underlying tax. Under specic conditions the introduction of
the minimum asset tax may even lower the marginal e¤ective tax rates. Their results are
in line with the wealth tax paradox that has been elaborated under certainty in Sureth
and Maiterth (2008).
Until now, no study has been conducted that addresses the investment and timing e¤ects
of a classical wealth tax in a stochastic environment with random cash ows. Particularly,
as studies on the recently proposed tax on corporate and individual wealth in Germany
indicate severe distortions (Spengel, Evers, and Evers 2013, Hoppe, Maiterth, and Sureth
2015), the investment e¤ects have to be analyzed prior to discussing potential distribu-
tional consequences. For example, Hoppe et al. (2015) nd in their company data-based
simulation that the tax burden on prots is doubled on average and in some cases even
quadrupled by the proposed wealth tax. Furthermore, on average 15% of corporations
equity is lost after six years of wealth taxation implying high risks for rms and jobs.
Against the background of these ndings, and the partially puzzling results from prior
research on wealth taxes, it is important to gain a deeper understanding of the e¤ects of
wealth taxes on risky investments. In this respect the economic e¤ects crucially depend
on the impact of taxes on investment timing, and not only on the decision on whether or
not to invest. If risky projects are considered innovative they can signicantly contribute
to economic growth. Thus, postponement of these projects may be especially harmful for
economic development (Bar-Ilan and Strange 1996, Riddick and Whited 2009, Bachmann,
Caballero, and Engel 2013).4
To ll the research gap we analyze the impact of wealth taxes on investment timing. We
4With respect to the impact of uncertainty on postponement of investment see, e.g., Arslan, Atabek,
Hulagu, and S¸ahinöz (2015).
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employ a real options model of the Dixit/Pindyck type to model investment behavior
under conditions of uncertainty and irreversibility. In addition to a prot tax, a wealth
tax is introduced. The wealth tax parameters under consideration include the wealth tax
rate, the initial and subsequent valuation of assets for wealth tax purposes, the valuation
method (historical cost versus fair value accounting) and the wealth tax treatment of the
default alternative. More specically, our model paves the way for future empirical studies
of investment timing under wealth taxation.
This paper is organized as follows. We present our investment model in section 2. The
impact of varying wealth tax parameters is analyzed in section 3. Neutrality aspects of
wealth taxation are discussed in section 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Model setup
Our model of investment is based on the Dixit/Pindyck framework that is frequently used
for the analysis of tax e¤ects under uncertainty and irreversibility. We assume that a risk-
neutral investor has the option to invest in an innitely-lived real investment project that
yields stochastic cash ows. This option is a proprietary business opportunity, which
is due to some earlier business activities by the investor. Typically, the option does
not represent an asset that can be recognized or traded. Rather, the option value is
a technical construct that is needed for the optimal decision. Since the investor holds a
monopoly on the option, we can exclude competition e¤ects.5 For reasons of mathematical
simplicity the option to invest is considered perpetual.6 The investment project can be
subject to wealth taxation. The investor uses individual calculus for valuation of both
the project and the option to invest. They can either immediately invest into the real
investment project or wait until the observable realizations of the cash ows prove to be
5For strategic option exercise games see, e.g., Grenadier (1996), Grenadier (2002), and Weeds (2002).
Grenadier (2002) shows that the impact of competition substantially diminishes the value of the option
and induces investment decisions similar to the net present value rule.
6Otherwise, the model would involve partial di¤erential equations that cannot be solved analytically.
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su¢ ciently attractive. Thus, the investment problem is two-dimensional as it captures
both the decision on whether and when to invest. We do not assume that the so-called
spanning property holds, implying that liquid markets for the assets do not necessarily
exist.7 As long as the option to invest is not exercised available funds yield the risk-
free capital market rate. If the option to invest is exercised, the investor gives up all
exibility and pays the deterministic acquisition cost for the project.8 We assume that
the project is entirely equity-nanced to separate the tax e¤ects from investment and
nancing decisions.
It is the aim of this paper to analyze the combined e¤ects of prot and wealth taxation on
investment timing. This research indicates that timing is an important issue in risk-taking
decisions and can be interpreted as a measure of an investors propensity to carry out risky
projects. For example, even high-performing rms are continuously challenged by new
competitors and new products and services in the market. Thus, rms have to balance
out exploitation of their current market share and exploration to generate new innovative
products, services and business models. No matter how successful a rm exploits its
current portfolio, investments in innovation have to be carried out at some time. As a
consequence, the decision on when to shift limited funds from the exploitation strategy to
the exploration strategy is an important timing decision. More or less all industries are
characterized by this trade-o¤. Given that real-world investment decisions are typically
now-or-later rather than now-or-never decisions, a real option framework is appropriate
for analyzing tax e¤ects on investment. Against this background, the tax treatment of
the investment project, the option to invest, and the default alternative (wait and see and
park funds in a risk-free nancial capital market asset) have all to be properly dened.
We consider only one level of taxation and thus abstract from the interaction of corporate
7As a consequence, a hedge portfolio that is crucial in option pricing theory cannot be built.
8Our assumption of deterministic and constant acquisition cost is due to mathematical simplicity.
However, it would be possible to model cash ows and acquisition costs as correlated stochastic processes,
see Dixit and Pindyck (1994), pp. 207-210. To focus on wealth tax e¤ects we leave this possible extension
aside.
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and shareholder level taxation. This assumption means that the investor is either a
sole proprietor or partner in a partnership (pass-through entity) or a corporation that
neglects shareholder taxation in corporate decision making. We do not discuss delegated
investment decisions or principal-agent settings.9 As long as the investor waits and does
not (yet) invest, they earn the nominal risk-free pre-tax interest rate r. Interest earned
is subject to the tax rate  r. In accordance with tax law in several countries the tax
rate on nancial income  r 2 [0; 1[ and the general income tax rate  2 [0; 1[ can
di¤er.10 Financial assets like bank accounts or bonds that yield interest income can be
(and typically are) subject to wealth taxation at the at rate ! 2 [0; 1[. The variable
 2 [0; 1] denotes the fraction of these nancial assets that is subject to wealth taxation.
As a result, the discount rate after taxes r is dened as11
r = (1   r) r   ! > 0: (1)
We will relax this assumption later to study how discount rates that are una¤ected by
taxation, for example, in case of a tax-exempt default investment, a¤ect our nding. Now,
we assume that the after-tax discount rate is decreasing in  r. Furthermore, it is always
strictly positive. Otherwise, present values could reach economically meaningless innite
values.12
As wealthy investors who tend to have a high savings rate, are likely to invest rather than
to consume liquid funds these assumptions about the default alternative are straight-
9For delegated investment decisions in a real options setting see, e.g., Grenadier/Wang (2005).
10In Austria, income from interest, dividends, or capital gains is subject to a at tax rate of 25%,
whereas the personal income tax schedule is progressive with a top marginal tax rate of 50%. In Germany
the at tax on interest and dividend income is 26.375% (including solidarity surcharge), but the top
marginal tax rate of the personal income tax is 47.475%. By contrast, Croatia is one of the few countries
which until 2014 did not tax individual interest income. Overall, many European and Asian countries
are characterized by tax systems with di¤erent tax scales on interest and dividend income on the one
hand side and other income (business, labor, etc.) on the other hand side. By contrast, the tax systems
in the Americas are typically characterized by a uniform tax rate on all types of income.
11With respect to the e¤ect of a wealth tax rate on the rate of interest see, e.g., Atkinson (1971, p.
217).
12Although an allowance for corporate equity (ACE) tax could be interpreted as a negative wealth tax,
we do not consider an ACE tax in our model. Due to the close connection of ACE and income taxation,
integrating an ACE would conceal rather than explain the wealth tax e¤ects.
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forward. Moreover, under some standard capital market assumptions, investment and
consumption decisions are separable.13 In this case, the investors time preference rate
would coincide with the capital market rate and it would not be necessary to take con-
sumption explicitly into account.
If however, the capital market properties did not permit this separation, the investor had
to decide between investment and consumption. This situation could be modelled by
an individual time preference rate  that would be used for discounting instead of the
risk-free interest rate r. As an exogenous parameter that reects the investors individual
preferences,  would be una¤ected by taxes: @ =@ r = @ =@! = @ =@ = 0. The re-
sulting wealth tax e¤ects therefore would be identical to the case with a constant risk-free
interest rate that is una¤ected by (wealth) taxes:  = @r=@! = 0. Consequently, this
special case not only corresponds to a wealth tax-exempt default alternative, but also
reects an explicit comparison of investment and consumption. To consider these impor-
tant special cases, the parameter setting  = 0 is constantly addressed in the subsequent
analysis.
If the investor decides to exercise the option to invest and to acquire the investment
project, they lose any further timing exibility and are bound to the project until innity.
However, the model does not include an obligation to invest in nite time. If the project
conditions are not su¢ ciently favorable the investor could theoretically postpone it until
innity. We normalize the acquisition cost to unity (I0 = 1). Once the project is in place
its only benets consist of the future operating cash ows . Thus, the pre-tax value of
the investment project is simply its expected present value.
In the following we develop our model stepwise, beginning with the pre-tax case (Dixit and
Pindyck 1994, pp. 138-140, Gries et al. 2012, p. 522). First, we abstract from uncertainty
and growth. Then, we integrate growth, taxes and uncertainty. Under certainty and
13See Fisher (1930, pp. 129-141) and Hirshleifer (1958).
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constant pre-tax cash ows  (t) =  the option value is equal to zero and the pre-tax
present value V of the project at time t = 0 computed with the pre-tax interest rate r is
V certainty =
Z 1
0
e rtdt =

r
; (2)
which is independent of t. The optimal time to invest is given by the critical thresholds
V  certainty =

r
)  certainty = r: (3)
Whenever  > r the investment should be carried out immediately. Otherwise, investment
should never be carried out. If the pre-tax cash ows  (t) grow deterministically at the
constant rate , with  < r, we obtain  (t) =  (0)  et and the present value of the
project is
V certainty =
Z 1
0
 (t) e rtdt =
 (0)
r   ; (4)
so that the critical threshold of the initial cash ow is given by
 certainty = r   . (5)
Introducing timing exibility, the project value can be written as
V certainty;growth (s) =
Z 1
s
 (0) e (r )(t s)dt =
 (0)  es
r    : (6)
Although this is a present value under certainty the positive growth parameter  implies
that the opportunity to invest at some future time s has a positive economic value that
can be interpreted as an option value F (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, pp. 138-139) with14
F = max
s

 (0)  es
r      1

 e rs: (7)
Maximizing F with respect to s yields the optimal investment time
dF
ds
=   (0)  e (r )s + r  e rs = 0 (8)
) s = max

0;
1

ln

r
 (0)

: (9)
14For   0, F (V ) is decreasing in s so that immediate investment would be optimal if V (0) > 1. In
this case the option value would be given by F (V ) = max fV   1; 0g.
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Now, immediate investment (s = 0) would be optimal for
r
 (0)
 1 ,  (0)  r: (10)
In the case of immediate investment with the critical threshold  (0) = r, the project
value is
V jcertainty;growths=0 =
r
r    > 1 = I0; (11)
implying a strictly positive NPV of the project. Substituting (9) in (7) yields the value
of the option to invest
F =
8<:

r 
 
0
r
 r
 for   ;
V   1 otherwise.
(12)
The after-tax case can be derived similarly. The operating cash ows  are subject to
income taxation. Operating cash ows as well as interest rates are given in nominal terms,
which means that they are not adjusted for ination. Depreciation d (t) can be deducted
from the tax base. Since depreciation deductions are generally not proportional to pre-tax
cash ows, after-tax cash ows do not grow at a constant rate even if pre-tax cash ows
do. Therefore, the resulting formulae are more complicated than those shown for the pre-
tax case. For analytical simplicity we assume that depreciation deductions for income tax
purposes are based on the acquisition cost of the project and decrease exponentially at the
rate .15 Thus, depending on the time structure of the projects cash ow depreciation
allowances may deviate from a neutral scheme of an economic depreciation. For an initial
outlay normalized to unity (I0 = 1) the depreciation deduction for income tax purposes
at time t is
d (t) = e
 t: (13)
Assuming a full and complete loss-o¤set, the cash ow after income taxes at time t
amounts to
 (t)   [ (t)  d (t)] = (1  ) (t) + e t: (14)
15This assumption does not restrict generality, because any other depreciation schedule like straight-
line depreciation or double-declining balance depreciation can be transformed to exponential depreciation
in identical present value terms. A similar approach is used in analytical models of e¤ective tax rates,
e.g., by King and Fullerton (1984, p. 29).
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The wealth tax has to be subtracted as second tax term from this (preliminary) cash ow.
If the wealth tax base at time t is given by W (t), total cash ow after taxes is
 (t) = (1  ) (t) + e t   !W (t) : (15)
The investor wants to determine the optimal time to invest and thus maximizes their
current wealth
max fV   1; Fg : (16)
This implies that the investor exercises the option to invest if the expected after-tax net
present value of the real investment project reaches the value of the option F .
We will now proceed with the after-tax case under growth and uncertainty. Assuming
stochastic cash ows  (t) and a risk neutral investor the after-tax value of the project
in place V at time t = 0 is dened as the expected net present value
V = V (0) = E
Z 1
0
 (t) e
 r tdt

: (17)
For further results the cash ow process has to be dened. In accordance with prior
literature (for example, McDonald and Siegel 1985, Dixit and Pindyck 1994, Niemann
1999b, Sureth 2002, Niemann and Sureth 2004, 2005) we assume that the pre-tax cash
ow  follows a geometric Brownian motion
d

= dt+ dz; (18)
with  < r as the expected growth rate of cash ows,  as the volatility rate, and dz as
increment of a standard Wiener process. Consequently, the expected pre-tax cash ow at
time t after investment is
E [ (t)] =  (0) et = 0e
t; (19)
which permits to write the project value as
V = E
Z 1
0

(1  ) (t) + e t   !W (t)

e r tdt

=
(1  )0
r    +

 + r
  !E
Z 1
0
W (t) e r tdt

: (20)
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Thus, the project value is dened as the sum of the present values of cash ows after
income taxes and tax savings due to depreciation deductions, less the present value of
wealth tax payments.
With regard to the wealth tax base we have to distinguish two general concepts: fair
value accounting and historical cost accounting.16 Under historical cost accounting for tax
purposes the initial wealth tax base W (0) equals some predened constant: W (0) = W .
The acquisition costWHC = I0 = 1 is the most important special case for the initial value.
However, it is also possible and current tax practice for assets in some jurisdictions 
that the initial value of an asset for wealth tax purposes does not relate to acquisition
cost or market price.17
Subsequent valuation under historical cost accounting is a function of the initial value
W . Similar to the valuation for income tax purposes we assume that the value for wealth
tax purposes is written o¤ exponentially at the rate !: WHC (t) = WHC  e !t.18 The
depreciation parameter ! is not necessarily positive, so that increasing or constant values
are also possible. To avoid innite present values we only require that ! >  r holds.
Under these assumptions the total project value simplies to
VHC =
(1  )0
r    +

r + 
  !WHC
r + !
: (21)
Under fair value accounting the initial wealth tax base should refer to the present value
of the project at time t = 0. Since market values do not necessarily exist for each asset, it
16Whenever we use the terms fair value accounting or historical cost accounting, we refer to
accounting for tax purposes rather than nancial accounting. Financial accounting is not considered
in this paper. Prior literature on property taxation indicates that the valuation method is crucial for
the investment e¤ects of non-prot taxes. See, e.g., Bentick (1979), Arnott (2005), Arnott and Petrova
(2006).
17The real estate tax (Grundsteuer) in Austria and in Germany can serve as an example for a rather
arbitrary valuation, because the assessed tax value (Einheitswert) is neither based on acquisition cost
nor on market value. The Austrian Constitutional Court even decreed the abolishment of the Aus-
trian estate tax due to the (extremely) unequal valuation of real estate compared to other assets. See
Verfassungsgerichtshof Österreich (2007).
18Again, any other depreciation schedule can be replicated by exponential depreciation in present value
terms. Hence, the assumption of exponential depreciation does not restrict generality.
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is common practice for the scal authorities to use multiplier methods based on current
cash ows or even past cash ows from annual nancial statements to approximate market
values (for example, Müller and Sureth 2011, Müller 2014).19 We assume that the scal
authorities use a multiplier f () = 1= > 0 for wealth tax purposes to compute the
projects initial value
W FV =
0

: (22)
This assumption implies that the growth and discount rates of the investor and the tax
authorities do not necessarily coincide,  T (r ). Like under historical cost accounting
the subsequent value for wealth tax purposes is written o¤ exponentially at the rate !:
WFV (t) = W FV  e !t. Again, ! can be positive, zero, or negative as long as the
condition ! >  r holds. Consequently, the project value under fair value accounting is
given by
VFV =
(1  )0
r    +

r + 
  !
0

r + !
: (23)
In contrast to historical cost accounting, the current value of the cash ow 0 a¤ects the
present value of expected wealth tax payments in the third summand.20
Given the value of the investment project we can determine the value of the option to
invest. Since the investor can only decide between waiting or exercising the option, the
decision variable is binary, and it is easily possible to determine the optimal investment
behavior. We will start with the waiting region in which the option is kept alive. The
optimal transition to the exercise region will be modeled by boundary conditions. Under
the given set of assumptions with a perpetual option to wait and stochastic cash ows
that grow at the expected rate , the originally two-dimensional investment problem of
whether and when to invest collapses to a pure timing problem. Consequently, there
exists an optimal one-dimensional threshold for transition. To solve this problem we use
19For valuation techniques using multiples see Damodaran (2011).
20We abstract from implications of a possible impact of the valuation approach on the volatility of the
market value as indicated, e.g., by Laux and Leuz (2009, 2010) and Laux (2012).
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dynamic programming to determine the option value.21
The option to invest itself does not generate any cash ows and thus no income tax base.
In principle, an option could be relevant for income tax as well as wealth tax purposes. For
example, the increase or decrease of the option value could be taxable or tax-deductible
under a given income tax scheme, respectively.22 Alternatively, the option value could be
subject to wealth taxation. However, tax systems in the real world do not recognize mere
business opportunities as taxable assets. Therefore, we neglect tax consequences of the
option to invest that might be relevant in ideal tax systems. Thus, the options after-tax
cash ow equals zero in the case considered here.
As long as the option is kept alive, its only benet is the expected increase in value. The
resulting equilibrium condition implies that the owner of the option expects an instanta-
neous return that equals the after-tax risk-free rate:
E [dF ]
!
= rdt: (24)
Application of Itôs lemma to the stochastic di¤erential dF and further transformation
yields the ordinary di¤erential equation23
1
2
22
d2F
d2
+ 
dF
d
  rdt = 0 (25)
with the solution
F () = A
 ; with  =
1
2
  
2
+
s
1
2
  
2
2
+
2r
2
> 1; (26)
where A > 0 is a constant to be determined. From A;  > 0 it is obvious that F (0) = 0
holds. This condition implies that an option on a valueless underlying is itself valueless.24
21For a comparison of dynamic programming and contingent claims analysis and the resulting tax
e¤ects see Niemann and Sureth (2004, 2005).
22Acquired real options like exploration rights, e.g., are depreciable under most tax regimes. Deprecia-
tion deductions on the option to invest are necessary in some neutral tax systems. See Niemann (1999b,
pp. 57, 61).
23Since the option to invest is perpetual, the time derivative vanishes here.
24Deriving the social value of the option would require extensive information that is beyond the scope
of this model, such as social preferences or a social discount rate. Thus, we focus on the individual
perspective. Musumeci and Sansing (2014) refer to the social value as an aggregate of project value and
the present value of prot taxes collected by the government.
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To derive the solution of the investment problem the critical investment threshold at
which it is optimal to exercise the option immediately two free boundary conditions are
needed (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, p. 141). The value matching condition requires that the
projects benets, as dened by its expected present value, must equal its costs, given by
acquisition costs and abandoned option value, at the point of transition.
V (0)  1 != F (0) : (27)
The smooth pasting condition requires the identity of marginal benets and marginal
costs at the critical threshold.
dV (0)
d0
!
=
dF (0)
d0
: (28)
Since the project value depends on whether historical cost accounting or fair value account-
ing is used for wealth tax purposes, we have to compute two di¤erent critical thresholds
from the value matching and the smooth pasting conditions.
The critical threshold for historical cost valuation is given by25
HC0 =

   1
 r   
1   (1  D + !D!) ; with D =

r + 
; D! =
WHC
r + !
(29)
or, equivalently
1  
r     
HC
0| {z }
after-tax PV of cash ows
=

   1| {z }
>1
0BB@ 1|{z}
acquisition costs
  D| {z }
PV of tax savings from
depreciation deductions
+ !D!| {z }
PV of wealth tax
1CCA : (30)
Equation (30) can be interpreted as follows. The expected present value of after-tax cash
ows must exceed the e¤ective acquisition cost of a project by a multiple = (   1) > 1
to cover the value of the option which is lost due to exercise. The e¤ective acquisition
cost comprise the gross acquisition cost I0 = 1 less the present value of the tax shield
of depreciation deductions for income tax purposes D plus present value of wealth
25The function 0 (without superscript) denotes a pre-tax function or pre-tax threshold. By contrast,
superscripts HC or FV indicate after-tax functions or after-tax thresholds.
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taxes !D! to be paid during the innite lifetime of the project. For ! = 0 the critical
threshold HC0 from (29) is identical to the thresholds developed in the earlier literature
with income taxes only.26
Under fair value accounting for wealth tax purposes with initial value W FV = 0= the
critical threshold is di¤erent from (29), because the critical value 0 appears twice in the
project value (23).
FV0 =

   1
  (r   ) (r + !)
 (1  ) (r + !)  ! (r   ) (1  D) : (31)
Since the critical investment thresholds (29) and (31) are nite, they are reached within
nite time in expected value terms, given the assumption of a geometric Brownian motion.
From a tax politicians perspective it might be relevant whether this expected time is
within the current legislation cycle.
To isolate the uncertainty e¤ect, we can derive the pre-tax investment threshold under
uncertainty as a special case from (29) and (31) by setting all tax rates to zero:  r =
 = ! = 0.27
0 = 
HC
0

r==!=0
= FV0

r==!=0
=

   1 (r   ) ; (32)
with  =  jr==0 =
1
2
  
2
+
s
1
2
  
2
2
+
2r
2
  > 1:
Obviously, the uncertainty e¤ect is reected in the fraction = (   1) > 1. This implies
that the expected NPV of the project is strictly positive at the time of exercise:
V = V (0) = E
Z 1
0
0e
 rtdt

=

   1 > 1: (33)
Under certainty (2 = 0), however, we have
lim
!0

   1 = 1; (34)
26See, for example, Niemann and Sureth 2005, p. 82.
27See Dixit and Pindyck 1994, p. 143. In case of non-separability of investment and consumption, the
interest rate r should be replaced by the time preference rate  .
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implying a critical investment threshold 0 = r , which is equivalent to the deterministic
case without timing exibility, eq. (5).
3 Investment timing e¤ects of wealth taxation
The impact of wealth taxation on investment timing can be determined by computing
the partial derivatives of the critical investment threshold HC0 =
FV
0 with respect to the
di¤erent wealth tax parameters. These parameters are:
 initial tax value of the project WHC for historical cost accounting,
 multiplier 1= for the initial tax value under fair value accounting,
 valuation method (historical cost versus fair value accounting),
 depreciation rate for wealth tax purposes !,
 taxable fraction of nancial assets  (wealth taxation of the default alternative),28
 wealth tax rate !.
Proposition 1 Increasing the initial tax value of the project WHC under historical cost
accounting unambiguously increases the critical investment threshold.29
Proof.
@HC0
@WHC
=

   1
 r   
1   
!
r + !
> 0: (35)
Proposition 2 Increasing the multiplier f () = 1= under fair value accounting unam-
biguously increases the critical investment threshold.
28E.g., in case of a property tax on real estate or a vehicle property tax we assume  = 0. Usually, a
general wealth tax implies  = 1.
29This partial derivative only makes sense under historical cost accounting. Under fair value accounting,
the initial tax value WFV is a function of the cash ow 0.
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Proof.
@FV0
@
=   
   1
 ! (r   )
2 (r + !)
[ (1  ) (r + !)  ! (r   )]2

1  
r + 

< 0:
Because
@f
@
=   1
2
< 0 and
@FV0
@
=
@FV0
@f
 @f
@
, @
FV
0
@f
=
@FV0
@
@f
@
> 0: (36)
The economic reasoning for both results is as follows. The higher the initial tax value of
the project, the higher the present value of wealth tax payments, whereas both the default
alternative and the value of the option to invest remain unchanged. Consequently, higher
initial tax values lead to lower expected after-tax returns from the risky investment,
require higher future cash ows and thus increase investment thresholds. As a result,
investment is delayed. Identical results hold under certainty (2 = 0), because varying 2
does not alter the algebraic sign of = (   1).
We can observe a corresponding result if we vary the subsequent valuation of the project,
which we model using the depreciation rate for wealth tax purposes !.
Proposition 3 Increasing the depreciation rate for wealth tax purposes ! under histori-
cal cost accounting and fair value accounting unambiguously reduces the critical investment
threshold.
Proof.
@HC0
@!
=   
   1
 r   
1   
!WHC
(r + !)
2 < 0; (37)
@FV0
@!
=   
   1
 ! (r   )
2
[ (1  ) (r + !)  ! (r   )]2


1  
r + 

< 0: (38)
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Higher depreciation deductions for wealth tax purposes reduce the present value of wealth
tax payments of the project. Again, both the default alternative and the value of the
option to invest remain unchanged. As a consequence, investment is accelerated, which
is also true under certainty.
In contrast to the previous results, the choice of the valuation method by the tax legislator
induces ambiguous e¤ects on investment timing. Whether historical cost valuation or fair
value accounting are more likely to accelerate or delay investments depends on the initial
value WHC and the multiplier 1=.
Proposition 4 The critical thresholds under historical cost valuation or fair value ac-
counting are identical only if the following relation of WHC and  holds:30
HC0 = 
FV
0 , WgHC = r + (1  ) r +  
 
r + 
HC
!

(r   )
 (1  )
 
r + 
FV
!
  ! (r   ) : (39)
ForWHC = WgHC the investor is indi¤erent between both valuation methods. ForWHC >
(<)WgHC historical cost valuation would delay (accelerate) investment compared to fair
value accounting.
Corollary 1 The e¤ects of varying the taxable fraction of nancial assets  are ambigu-
ous.
Corollary 2 The e¤ects of varying the wealth tax rate ! are ambiguous.
Proof. To prove the existence of ambiguous results it is su¢ cient to show that the partial
derivatives @HC=FV0 =@ and @
HC=FV
0 =@! may take either algebraic sign for at least one
parameter setting. See the numerical results below.
The e¤ects of varying the taxable fraction of nancial assets  and the wealth tax rate
! depend on the tax and non-tax parameters r, , ,  r, , !, and . Although the
30The indi¤erence condition accounts for di¤erent depreciation deductions for historical cost and fair
value accounting. The respective values for ! are indicated with superscripts HC and FV .
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partial derivatives @HC=FV0 =@ and @
HC=FV
0 =@! are too complicated to be studied ana-
lytically, numerical examples show that either algebraic sign is possible. In line with prior
reasoning on the wealth tax e¤ects on investment decisions under certainty (Wagner and
Dirrigl 1980, Siegel 1982, Mellwig 1985 and Georgi 1994) we nd puzzling and probably
unintended e¤ects of wealth taxation under uncertainty. In the following, we elaborate
on which e¤ect prevails under specic conditions. We dene the e¤ects of wealth tax-
ation as normal if increasing wealth taxation of the investment project increases the
critical investment threshold and thus delays investment and if increasing wealth tax-
ation of nancial assets (default alternative) reduces the critical investment threshold,
i.e. if @HC=FV0 =@! > 0 or @
HC=FV
0 =@ < 0. Otherwise, for @
HC=FV
0 =@! < 0 or
@
HC=FV
0 =@ > 0, we call the emerging tax e¤ects paradoxical.
31 Further computations
of the partial derivatives @HC0 =@! and @
HC
0 =@ in the limiting cases  ! 0 (certainty),
 !1, r !1 are included in the appendix.
With respect to , the occurrence of normal or paradoxical wealth tax e¤ects essentially
depends on the level of the after-tax discount rate. For su¢ ciently high after-tax discount
rates r , normal tax e¤ects prevail. Hence, for high pre-tax interest rates, real-world levels
of income tax rates  and  r, and low or moderate levels of the wealth tax rate !, the
partial derivatives @HC0 =@ and @
FV
0 =@ are negative, which means that increasing the
taxable fraction of nancial assets reduces the critical investment threshold and hence
accelerates real investment. This e¤ect is plausible, because increasing  does not a¤ect
cash ows from investment and only reduces the after-tax discount rate r . Hence, the
real investment benets in relative terms from the higher wealth taxation of the default
alternative. Therefore, the present value of the investment project increases while the
corresponding increase of the present value of wealth tax payments is not equally sub-
stantial. Moreover, a lower discount rate typically reduces option values (for example,
Merton 1973), which makes immediate investment more attractive. An increased project
31For paradoxical income tax e¤ects see, e.g., Niemann and Sureth (2013). For the wealth tax paradox
see Sureth and Maiterth (2008).
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value and a reduced option value both contribute to accelerated investment.
However, with after-tax discount rates su¢ ciently close to zero, increasing  increases the
critical investment threshold so that a paradoxical wealth tax e¤ect occurs.32 In these
cases, increasing  reduces the discount rate such that the present value of wealth taxes
increases relatively more than the present value of cash ows. This paradoxical e¤ect
can be shown under historical cost valuation as well as under fair value accounting. The
wealth tax paradox occurs for low pre-tax interest rates and a high level of the wealth
tax rate. Hence, as investors currently face very low interest rates in the capital market,
paradoxical e¤ects are likely to occur. These e¤ects tend to be even more distinctive
for high cash ow uncertainty. The identied e¤ects are highly relevant and should be
considered by investors and politicians.
Similar to the decision under certainty, depreciation of the project for wealth tax purposes
is a crucial determinant of paradoxical tax e¤ects. If the investment project is depreciated
su¢ ciently quickly, increased wealth taxation is likely to accelerate investment. In addi-
tion to the decision under certainty, the value of the option to invest has to be considered.
If the option is disregarded for tax purposes and hence not subject to wealth taxation
(despite its positive economic value), it has a relative benet compared to the pre-tax
case. The resulting relative increase of the option value tends to delay investment, hereby
mitigating paradoxical wealth tax e¤ects.
To illustrate scenarios that lead to normal and paradoxical wealth tax e¤ects we use
numerical examples with the parameters r = 0:04,  = 0,  = 0:3,  =  r = 0:25,  =
0:3 (Figure 1).33
32See Gries et al. (2012), who identify general conditions for neutral, normal, and paradoxical tax
regimes if the di¤erential between the drift parameter of the stochastic cash ow and the after-tax
interest rate is su¢ ciently small.
33The after-tax discount rate r is always strictly positive in the examples considered here.
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For ! = 0 the wealth tax value of the investment project is constant over time. Examples
for a time-invariant tax value are investments in land or corporate stock.34 Figure 1
displays the critical investment threshold under historical cost accounting as a function of
the parameter . Currently, wealth tax rates range from 0.5% to 2.5% (see Table 1). We
observe normal e¤ects with respect to  for ! = 0:01 (dashed line, slightly decreasing),
and paradoxical e¤ects for ! = 0:02 (dotted line, increasing). As a reference case, the
solid line indicates the critical threshold without wealth taxation (! = 0). For fair value
accounting, the e¤ects are similar and therefore not displayed here.
Figure 1: Critical investment threshold under
historical cost accounting as a function of the
wealth tax parameter .
For typical wealth tax rates (here: ! = 0:01) the impact of wealth taxation on the after-
tax discount rate is rather small. Consequently, variations of the fraction  of nancial
assets that is subject to wealth taxation do not a¤ect the present value of cash ows and
wealth tax payments as much as under higher wealth tax rates (here: ! = 0:02). In the
latter case, lower after-tax discount rates due to higher values of  increase the present
value of wealth tax payments relatively more than the present value of cash ows. For
lower pre-tax interest rates (r < 0:04) paradoxical reactions are even more likely to occur.
34Studies that identify apparently paradoxical prot tax e¤ects on the timing of risky investments in
non-depreciable assets like land or corporate stock are, e.g., Schneider and Sureth (2010) and Gries et al.
(2012).
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For example, if r = 0:02 already a wealth tax rate of 0:6% induces paradoxical timing
e¤ects.
Besides , we have identied the wealth tax rate ! to be an important driver of ambiguous
outcomes. Only if the default alternative is wealth tax-exempt or if the investor uses an
exogenous time preference rate  for discounting, increasing the wealth tax rate induces
unambiguous e¤ects.
Proposition 5 For a wealth tax-exempt default alternative ( = 0) or if an individual
time preference rate  is used for discounting increasing the wealth tax rate always induces
normal e¤ects.
Proof.
@HC0
@!

=0
=

   1
 r   
1   
WHC
r (1   r) + ! > 0: (40)
To illustrate the forces at work Figure 2 displays the critical investment threshold as a
function of the wealth tax rate ! for  = 1 (solid line) and  = 0 (dashed line). For
! = 0 (constant tax value of the project) we observe normal wealth tax e¤ects. Hence,
the critical investment threshold increases with increasing wealth tax rate. This result
also holds in the limiting case of certainty (2 = 0).35
35The assumption  = 0 in our numerical example implies that in expected value terms the cash ows
are constant over time. Figure 2 thus illustrates the special case of an approximization of an economic
depreciation for ! = 0: Furthermore, also appreciations in the option value at any point in time would
have to be recognized by economic depreciation as outlined in Niemann (1999b).
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Figure 2: Critical investment threshold under
historical cost accounting as a function of the
wealth tax rate !
By contrast, if the tax law permits su¢ ciently high depreciation deductions for wealth tax
purposes, the present value of wealth tax payments decreases, which lowers the critical in-
vestment threshold. Positive capital depreciation allowances are common for depreciable
assets in most countries that levy a wealth tax. Usually, they correspond to depreciation
allowances used for prot tax purposes. The ambiguous tax e¤ects that arise if deprecia-
tion allowances reduce the wealth tax base are depicted in Figure 3, which also displays
the critical investment threshold as a function of the wealth tax rate ! for  = 1 (solid
line) and  = 0 (dashed line). For ! =  = 0:3, we observe a normal tax e¤ect for  = 0
and a paradoxical tax e¤ect for  = 1. The neutral values of depreciation deductions for
which neither a normal nor a paradoxical tax e¤ect occurs, are derived in section 4.
The paradoxical e¤ect arises because a higher wealth tax rate reduces the after-tax dis-
count rate, increasing the present value of cash ows more than the present value of wealth
tax payments.
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Figure 3: Critical investment threshold under
historical cost accounting as a function of the
wealth tax rate !
The results presented in Figures 2 and 3 do not change fundamentally if the prot tax
is completely replaced by the wealth tax, i.e.,  =  r = 0, ! > 0 and r = r   !,
as can be observed from Figures 4 and 5. We can regard the abolition of prot taxation
as an extreme interpretation of raising wealth taxes. These numerical examples show
the impact of the wealth tax rate ! on the critical investment threshold, provided that
prot taxes are not levied. Again, the parameter setting is given by r = 0:04,  = 0,
! 2 f0; 0:3g,  2 f0; 1g,  = 0:3.
It turns out that the wealth tax e¤ects are roughly similar to a scenario with prot tax-
ation. However, abolishing (introducing) prot taxation can either reduce (increase) the
critical investment threshold, as can be observed by comparing Figures 2 and 4, or in-
crease (reduce) the critical threshold as is shown by Figures 3 and 5. As a consequence,
the interactions between wealth and prot taxes are parameter-dependent and further-
more depend on asset valuation. We illustrate these e¤ects exemplarily for the case of
historical cost valuation for wealth tax purposes.
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Figure 4: Critical investment threshold
under historical cost accounting as a
function of the wealth tax rate ! for
 =  r = 0
Figure 5: Critical investment threshold
under historical cost accounting as a
function of the wealth tax rate ! for
 =  r = 0
Again, we nd paradoxical reactions for su¢ ciently high depreciation allowances. Sum-
marizing our numerical ndings, paradoxical wealth tax e¤ects tend to be more likely
for
 low pre-tax interest rates r,
 high volatility ,
 high growth rates ,
 high wealth tax rates !,
 high taxation of the default alternative .
4 Neutral tax systems
Having identied settings that lead to both normal and paradoxical reactions, it is impor-
tant to gure out under what conditions such distortions can be avoided. By denition,
neutral tax systems do not alter economic decisions compared to a given reference solu-
tion. In our setting a neutral tax system should leave the critical investment threshold
unchanged. Since our focus is wealth taxation, but our model also includes income taxes,
the necessary rst step is to dene an appropriate reference case. In a strict sense, the tax
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system is neutral if the pre-tax investment threshold is identical to the after-tax threshold,
taking both wealth and income taxation into account.
We derived the pre-tax investment threshold 0 = (= (   1)) (r   ) in eq. (32). For
deriving neutral tax systems it is necessary and su¢ cient to equate the pre-tax and the
after-tax investment thresholds and to solve for the tax parameters under consideration.
As there are various tax parameters with potentially o¤setting e¤ects an innite number
of neutral tax systems may exist. Due to di¤erent investment thresholds for historical
cost and fair value accounting, neutrality conditions have to distinguish between these
valuation methods.
For historical cost valuation we can derive the neutrality condition by equating the critical
investment thresholds from (29) and (32) and further transformation:
0
!
= HC0
!D!   D = 
   1 
   1

 r   
r     (1  )  1: (41)
This condition means that the present value of wealth taxes less the present value of tax
shields due to depreciation deductions for income tax purposes must equal the constant
on the right hand side. For a given depreciation rate for income tax purposes , the
neutrality condition (41) translates to a neutral depreciation rate for wealth tax purposes:
neutral! =
!WHC

 1   1 
r 
r   (1  )  1 +  +r
  r : (42)
This neutral depreciation rate is a function of the after-tax discount rate r and the
wealth tax rate !. Figure 6 displays the neutral depreciation rate for  = 1 considering
the example from Figures 2 and 3 with the parameters r = 0:04,  = 0,  = 0:3,  =
 r = 0:25,  = 0:3.
29
Figure 6: Neutral depreciation rate for wealth tax
purposes as a function of the wealth tax rate
If the actual depreciation rate exceeds the neutral one, investment is accelerated, as is
exemplarily shown in Figure 3. Otherwise, if the actual depreciation rate is below the
function plotted in Figure 6, investment is delayed by increasing wealth taxation, as in
Figure 2. Figure 6 also explains why Figure 2 shows normal and Figure 3 paradoxical
wealth tax e¤ects for  = 1. In contrast to models under certainty, condition (42) claries
that it is not su¢ cient for neutrality to set  and ! to the economic rate of depreciation
  (which is 0 in the example above). Rather, tax neutrality requires neutral taxation
of the option to invest, which implies taxation of unrealized capital gains.36
The neutrality condition (41) can be further simplied only if the default alternative re-
mains tax-exempt or if the investor uses an individual time preference rate for discounting
( r =  = 0, r = r ,  =  or if r =  ):
!D!   D =   (43)
and thus
36Since tax systems in the real world do not recognize mere business opportunities as taxable assets,
the neutral treatment of the option to invest is not considered here. See Niemann (1999b) for neutral
income taxation of an option to invest.
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! =
D   1
D!
: (44)
As a consequence, in neutral tax systems with depreciation deductions limited to acqui-
sition costs (D  1) tax-exemption of the default alternative prohibits positive wealth
taxation of real investment.
If the default alternative is not tax-exempt ( r > 0;  > 0) it is always possible to nd
combinations of D! and D that fulll the neutrality condition. However, it cannot be
guaranteed that these algebraic solutions are feasible within the range of real-world tax
systems (0  D  1). Therefore, the analytically determined neutral tax system might
be only theoretically relevant and de facto impossible to be implemented in the real world.
For fair value accounting the neutrality condition can be solved with respect to the present
value of depreciation deductions for income tax purposes.
0
!
= FV0 ;
D =
1

  0
0   1
    1

 r   

  (1  ) (r + !)  ! (r   )
 (r   ) (r + !)
=
1

  0
0   1
    1

 r   



1  
r     
!
 (r + !)

: (45)
Again, for a tax-exempt default alternative (r = r or r =  ) a neutral depreciation
schedule is not feasible within the range of traditional tax systems, because the present
value of depreciation deductions exceeds the acquisition costs:
Djr==0 = 1 +
!

 r   
 (r + !)
> 1 (for ! >  r ):
More general neutrality conditions could be derived if the option to invest would be
regarded as an asset for wealth tax purposes.
5 Conclusions and implications
We analyze the impact of wealth taxation on investment timing decisions under uncer-
tainty and irreversibility. From the variety of wealth tax parameters only a few induce
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unambiguous results. As could be expected, higher initial values of a project for tax
purposes delay investment. This result holds for historical cost valuation as well as for
fair value accounting. Which one of these valuation methods tends to accelerated (or less
delayed) investment is ambiguous and depends upon the initial value. Moreover, higher
depreciation rates for wealth tax purposes corresponding to a lower subsequent valuation
also accelerate investment. In this respect we identify normal e¤ects only.
By contrast, the wealth tax rate as well as the wealth tax treatment of the default al-
ternative can induce either normal or apparently paradoxical investment timing e¤ects.
For a su¢ ciently low valuation of a project due to a low initial tax value or high depre-
ciation rates for wealth tax purposes, higher wealth tax rates can accelerate investment.
Otherwise, the normal e¤ect occurs and higher wealth tax rates delay investment. Higher
wealth taxation of the default alternative can delay investment if the wealth tax rate is
su¢ ciently high so that the present value of wealth tax payments increases more than
the project value. Otherwise, the resulting normal tax e¤ect means that higher taxation
of the default alternative favors accelerated investment. We nd that apparently para-
doxical wealth tax e¤ects (delay upon a wealth tax rate decrease) are more likely for
low interest rates and for high-risk investments. Furthermore, we derive conditions for
an investment neutral wealth tax that avoids such distortions. Whether and how often
a normal or a paradoxical tax e¤ect prevails is an empirical question and depends on
the above-mentioned wealth tax parameters as well as the pre-tax interest rate and the
expected cash ows of the investment project.
These results indicate that the tax legislator should be aware of the opposing e¤ects
of wealth taxation on di¤erent types of projects prior to tax reforms. Estimations of
revenues, as well as the redistributional potential of a wealth tax can only be meaningful
if the investment e¤ects are anticipated correctly. It is doubtful whether the tax legislators
objectives can be reached by wealth-related taxes. We show that tax neutrality requires
project-specic depreciation rules that are di¢ cult to implement from the perspective of
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legal certainty. It is therefore highly likely that wealth taxation has real economic e¤ects.
If the tax legislator intends to favor the realization of particular projects, it will depend
on the economic parameters whether this aim or its opposite will be reached. If the tax
legislator tries to prevent taxpayers from certain economic activities, for example, car
usage, our examples show that wealth taxes are neither an accurate tax policy device to
do so, nor will they necessarily imply an increase in revenues.
Of course, our analysis is subject to several limitations. Whereas the current tax policy
discussion is centered on distributive considerations, our model does not permit conclu-
sions regarding the distribution of wealth after the introduction of a wealth tax. Due to
our assumption of equity nancing, nancial constraints and liquidity considerations are
disregarded in the model. The revenue consequences of a wealth tax cannot be inferred
from our results. This is because we take an individual rather than a macro perspec-
tive and focus on purely domestic investment. Investigating aggregate e¤ects of wealth
taxation would require extensive assumptions beyond the scope of our model, such as a
social discount rate or the usage of tax revenues, even if all investors were homogenous.
Therefore, we delegate aggregate as well as distributive e¤ects to future research.
Moreover, compliance costs, which are often assumed substantial for wealth taxes are
disregarded here. Our model is able to predict the investment timing e¤ects of one
type of wealth-related taxation, but not the combined e¤ects of either di¤erent capital
taxes levied simultaneously or of di¤erential tax rates for di¤erent types of assets. For
reasons of mathematical simplicity our model is limited to a perpetual option to invest.
Presuming a nite option lifetime and hence reduced option value we would expect less
distinctive results. Furthermore, we assume a full and complete loss o¤set. Relaxing this
assumption is likely to generate tax-induced delays more often.37 Whereas income taxes
37See Mehrmann, Schneider, and Sureth (2012) who study timing decisions under asymmetric taxation
of gains and losses and identify conditions for higher taxes to increase investorspropensity to invest
early. For the e¤ects of asymmetric taxation in a real options model with an imputation tax system see
Panteghini (2005).
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can be regarded as variable costs, wealth taxes are xed costs. It is therefore likely that
income taxation shifts more risk from the investor to the scal authorities than wealth
taxes. However, our model does not permit a formal proof of this conjecture. In contrast
to our setting with risk neutral investors, investors are often considered risk averse. In
principle, contingent claims analysis would allow us to abstract from risk aversion and use
risk neutral valuation in real option approaches. Unfortunately, this approach requires
the spanning property and a sophisticated Tax-CAPM that addresses the di¤erent risk
proles and taxation of the underlying and the options adequately. For our setting the
integration of risk aversion still comprises a bunch of unsolved theoretical caveats.38
In the light of the ongoing discussion on the introduction or increase of wealth-related taxes
in several countries despite the well-known ine¢ ciencies of these taxes, it is evident that
the impact of wealth taxation on investments in risky projects is uncertain. Accounting
for normal and paradoxical outcomes at the same time might impact economic growth
negatively. Additional uncertainty arises not only because of frequent tax reforms but
because of the risks involved in the valuation procedures and strictly project-dependent
investment e¤ects of a wealth tax. This might wind down investorspropensity to carry
out risky projects. Empirical tests are needed to learn more about the likelihood of
normal and paradoxical outcomes and the magnitude of the identied tax e¤ects. In
further research our model should be extended with respect to stochastic wealth taxes.
For example, wealth tax payments and not only cash ows should be considered as
a stochastic process as valuation in practice often turns out to be a de facto random
endeavor.
38See Niemann and Sureth (2004) who investigate neutral prot taxation under risk aversion.
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6 Appendix
To describe in more detail which conditions induce normal or paradoxical tax e¤ects, we
compute the partial derivatives @HC0 =@! and @
HC
0 =@ in some limiting cases.
The critical investment threshold for historical cost accounting is given by
HC0 =

   1
 r   
1   

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To compute the partial derivatives with respect to ! and  we use the substitutions
f =

   1
; (47)
g =
r   
1   ; (48)
h = 1  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 + !
; (49)
so that the critical investment threshold can be written as HC0 = f  g  h. Consequently,
we have
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Substitution and further transformation yields
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   1
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
(r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2

| {z }
R0
: (54)
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Although this expression is too complicated for a general discussion, it is possible to derive
the algebraic sign of the partial derivative for some limiting cases.
Proposition 6 In the limiting case of no uncertainty ( ! 0), the e¤ect of increasing
the capital tax rate is indeterminate.
Proof.
lim
!0
@HC0
@!
=
1
1  

    WHC!
r + !
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
r + 

+
r   
1  

WHC [r (1   r) + !]
(r + !)
2  

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 + )
2

= g|{z}
>0
0BBB@ @h@!|{z}
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  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Proposition 7 In the limiting case of uncertainty approaching innity ( ! 1), the
e¤ect of increasing the capital tax rate is indeterminate.
Proof.
lim
!1
@HC0
@!
= lim
!1

h 

@f
@!
 g + f  @g
@!

+ f  g  @h
@!

= h  lim
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
@f
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 g + f  @g
@!

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@!
 lim
!1
f
=   2
1    h+ g 
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@!
 1
= 1  sgn

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@!

: (56)
The results of these extreme cases indicate that the impact of increasing the wealth tax
rate largely depends on the valuation of the project as long as the default alternative is
(at least partially, 0 <   1) subject to wealth taxation. The degree of uncertainty is
crucial for the likelihood of paradoxical investor reactions.
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Considering the impact of wealth taxation of the default alternative, we have a very
similar partial derivative
@HC0
@
=
@f
@
 g  h+ f  @g
@
 h+ f  g  @h
@
; (57)
with
@f
@
=
!
2 (   1)2
 
   12 + 2
  0; (58)
@g
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=
 !
1    0; (59)
@h
@
=
 2!WHC
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 + !)
2  
!
(r + )
2 R 0: (60)
Substitution and further transformation yields
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=

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1  | {z }
>0

!WHC
(r + !)
2  

(r + )
2

| {z }
R0
: (61)
Proposition 8 In the limiting case of pre-tax interest rates approaching innity (r !
1), increasing the capital-taxable fraction of the default alternative always reduces the
critical investment threshold.
Proof.
lim
r!1
@HC0
@
=
 !
1   < 0: (62)
Proposition 9 In the limiting case of no uncertainty ( ! 0), the e¤ect of increasing
the capital-taxable fraction of the default alternative is indeterminate.
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Proof.
lim
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Proposition 10 In the limiting case of uncertainty approaching innity ( ! 1), the
e¤ect of increasing the capital-taxable fraction of the default alternative is indeterminate.
Proof.
lim
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